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ABSTRACT
Scholars demonstrate that speakers engaged in social 
interactions can impede other participants by speaking over them 
and by specifically using negative language during conversations. In 
addition, females are more likely to fall prey to these tactics and to 
be adversely affected by them. To test these claims, we turn to 
Supreme Court oral arguments to determine whether female 
attorneys appearing at the nation’s highest court are treated 
differently than their male counterparts by the Justices. Our findings 
demonstrate that female attorneys do not get to speak as often as 
their male counterparts and they also face more negative language 
from the bench than do male attorneys who appear at the nation’s 
highest court.
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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Maryland v. King1 was a 
major victory for law enforcement and prosecutors alike. The Court 
held that conducting a DNA swab test as part of the arrest procedure 
does not violate the Fourth Amendment because the test serves a 
legitimate state interest and is not so invasive so as to require a 
warrant. In short, the Court created another clear exception to the
warrant requirement. This may have major future implications for 
the rights of the criminally accused.2
Beyond the substantive impact of King, the oral arguments in 
this, potentially landmark, case also exemplify another key issue—
specifically how female attorneys are treated by the Court compared 
to their male counterparts. Consider Katherine Winfree’s argument. 
As she began to make Maryland’s position by citing statistics 
supporting the practice of the DNA collection of arrestees, and even 
before she got through twenty seconds of her argument, Justice 
Antonin Scalia interjected with a joke: “I’ll bet you, if you conducted 
a lot of unreasonable searches and seizures, you’d get more 
convictions, too.”3 This remark produced laughter from the gallery as 
Justice Scalia made his opinion even clearer: “That proves absolutely 
nothing.”4 As these statements indicate, Scalia did not agree with 
Winfree’s view of the case and ultimately voted with three others 
against Maryland.5
In contrast, Deputy Solicitor General Michael R. Dreeben, also 
arguing for the petitioner, relayed facts about the privacy of the 
arrestees for nearly a full minute before Chief Justice John Roberts 
interjected.6 In response to Dreeben’s statement that arrestees are not 
free citizens, Roberts made a clarifying statement: “Yes, but that 
doesn’t mean, for example, that you can go into their house without a 
warrant.”7 Roberts ultimately voted in support of the petitioner.8
1. 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013).
2. Richard Lempert, Maryland v. King: An Unfortunate Supreme Court 
Decision on the Collection of DNA Samples, BROOKINGS (June 6, 2013), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2013/06/06/maryland-v-king-an-
unfortunate-supreme-court-decision-on-the-collection-of-dna-samples/ [https://
perma.cc/ND9T-P62S].
3. Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013) (No. 12-
207).
4. Id.
5. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1965. 
6. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 3, at 14-15.
7. Id. at 15. 
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Interestingly, Scalia did not speak until almost fifteen minutes of 
Dreeben’s argument had passed.9
The question that piques our interest is why were these two 
attorneys, both arguing for the same side in King, treated so 
differently as they began their arguments? Are the differences in 
treatment due to differences in experience or argument style, or 
might they be attributed to another factor including the gender of the 
two attorneys appearing at the bar? And, if it is the latter, is this 
difference an anomaly or a pattern of behavior at the U.S. Supreme 
Court? To investigate these questions, we test several hypotheses 
about how female attorneys may be treated differently when arguing 
at the nation’s highest court. 
The results indicate, consistent with existing literature, that 
female attorneys do not get to use as much of their time as their male 
colleagues. This, however, is not all; female attorneys also receive 
fewer positive emotional signals from the Justices in the form of 
more negative, emotional language infused in questions from the 
bench. Combined, these findings reaffirm prior literature that shows 
the treatment of women in political deliberations is not always equal 
to the treatment of men. More generally, this demonstrates that even 
in front of the Supreme Court—an institution we would expect to be 
more sensitive to the fair treatment of litigants—female attorneys 
face an uphill battle.
This Article proceeds as follows. In the next Part we explicate 
our theoretical argument that leads us to expect women to be treated 
differently than their male colleagues during the Court’s oral 
arguments. To do so we first discuss how women within the political 
and judicial systems are often treated during political discussions. 
Second, we turn to a general discussion of how individuals, 
specifically females engaged in group discussions, may be affected 
by speakers who do not allow them to speak as much and how, in 
particular, females may be affected by such negative treatment. 
Third, we turn to the existing works that suggest that understanding 
how Justices act during Supreme Court oral arguments provides a 
key indicator of what they think about a case. Next, based on these 
literatures, we lay out the main hypotheses we seek to test. Finally, 
we describe our data and modeling strategies, delineate our results, 
and then make several concluding remarks.
8. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1980. 
9. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 3, at 14, 27.
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I. GENDER, POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS, AND APPELLATE ARGUMENTS
Women’s widespread participation in political and judicial 
spheres over the past half century raises questions about their role 
and treatment within these institutional structures. The picture is not 
always pretty. As Karpowitz and Mendelberg10 note, women are less 
likely than men to try to convince others to agree with their opinions 
and are also less likely than men to believe they are “capable of 
speaking up and effectively contributing” to a political discussion.11
A similar pattern emerges among law students: Men at Yale Law 
School were shown to outtalk their women counterparts at similar 
rates in both 2012 and 2002.12 Such inequalities suggest this gender 
disparity pattern may not be changing, even though women are key 
players in the political and judicial arenas.
More specifically, scholars suggest the way women act in 
political discussions is a product of gendered stereotypes that 
continue to persist within our culture and particularly within the 
political system.13 For instance, women politicians are typically 
preferred for handling issues relating to care (like social welfare and 
education) while men are preferred for issues in the “men’s domain,”
like economics, crime, and foreign policy.14 Additionally, these 
issues are typically seen as those which are important for good 
leadership. When women break societal expectations and display 
leadership characteristics, it often “backfire[s] by presenting women 
as anomalies in the masculine domain of power.”15 The result for 
Karpowitz and Mendelberg is that “[s]ociety may be continually 
sending such signals to women and thereby creating the sense that 
leadership is . . . not valued for women.”16
We are particularly interested in whether how women are 
treated in political discussions generally translates into how attorneys 
are treated when they appear in front of the federal judiciary. Szmer, 
Kaheny, Sarver, and DeCamillis17 examine this question as it relates 
10. CHRISTOPHER E. KARPOWITZ & TALI MENDELBERG, THE SILENT SEX:
GENDER, DELIBERATIONS, AND INSTITUTIONS (2014).
11. Id. at 39.
12. Id. at 44.
13. Id. at 33-34. 
14. Id. at 47.
15. Id. at 47. 
16. Id. at 48.
17. John Szmer et al., The Impact of Attorney Gender on Decision Making 
in the United States Courts of Appeals, 34 J. WOMEN, POL. & POL’Y 72, 72 (2013).
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to the U.S. Court of Appeals. Their analysis is consistent with 
Karpowitz and Mendelberg’s general findings.18 Indeed, while Szmer 
and his colleagues find female attorneys are more likely to win cases 
even if the cases have nothing to do with “women’s issue[s,]” they 
also find that when the lower court is reversed by a circuit, women 
attorneys are less likely to find support from appellate court judges.19
The point is that female attorneys are at a disadvantage “in the very 
cases in which advocacy might be most crucial at the circuit court 
level.”20
While Szmer et al. focus on the federal circuits, Phillips and 
Carter turn to our court of interest—the U.S. Supreme Court.21 To 
determine how women are treated in the nation’s highest court, they 
focus on five terms of oral argument data (2004–2009). Specifically, 
they analyze the total words spoken by the attorneys as well as how 
many questions and comments Justices aim at each side in a case.22
Their findings are consistent with the literature but must be heeded 
with caution given the small number of terms they analyze. In 
particular, and consistent with Johnson et al.,23 who show that 
Justices ask more questions to the side with which they disagree, 
Phillips and Carter find that Justices tend to speak to female 
attorneys more often (even when controlling for ideology).24 That 
said, liberal Justices generally seem to speak less often to female 
attorneys. Overall, Phillips and Carter suggest female attorneys may 
simply fare less well at the Court because of how they are treated at 
oral arguments.25
Most recently, Patton and Smith reveal female attorneys are 
affected greatly by the unconscious gendered treatment by Supreme 
Court Justices.26 They find women are interrupted more often than 
men, for longer periods than men, and overall speak about 350 fewer 
18. KARPOWITZ & MENDELBERG, supra note 10, at 33-50.
19. Szmer et al., supra note 17, at 72.
20. Id.
21. James C. Phillips & Edward L. Carter, Gender and U.S. Supreme Court 
Oral Argument on the Roberts Court: An Empirical Examination, 41 RUTGERS L.J.
613, 643 (2010).
22. See id. at 643.
23. See generally Timothy R. Johnson et al., Inquiring Minds Want to 
Know: Do Justices Tip Their Hands with Questions at Oral Argument in the U.S. 
Supreme Court? 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 241 (2009).
24. Phillips & Carter, supra note 21, at 643.
25. See id. at 643.
26. Dana Patton & Joseph L. Smith, Lawyer, Interrupted: Gender Bias in 
Oral Arguments at the U.S. Supreme Court, 5. J.L. & CTS. 348 (2017).
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words during oral argument than men.27 Interestingly, even as the 
number of women on the Supreme Court increases, this effect has 
not dissipated. Perhaps most important for Patton and Smith is that 
the typical benefit of being on the winning side—meaning being 
interrupted less often—is not afforded to women. Instead, “[f]emale 
lawyers are treated like losers whether they are on the winning side 
or not.”28
II. SPEAKING TIME AND NEGATIVE TREATMENT DURING 
DISCUSSIONS
The question is how do these signals manifest themselves in 
women’s behavior? Here we focus on signaling through social 
interactions, as these interactions often play a large part in 
reinforcing the idea that women are less powerful than men. For our 
purposes, we suggest this phenomenon reveals itself through Justices 
speaking more than female attorneys (while they do not take the 
same tack with male attorneys) and through the use of negative 
interruptions specifically during discussions. 
We turn first to the general idea of how speakers interact with 
one another in order to accomplish goals in a decision-making 
context. Sociologists, economists, and psychologists have long 
studied the way in which humans interact toward, and react with, one 
another in a group decision-making context. We are particularly 
interested in how actors treat speakers who are charged with 
providing information within group discussions. Consider that when 
a person speaks in a group context she does so to accomplish 
interactional goals or to block others from accomplishing theirs.29
27. Id.
28. Patton & Smith, supra note 26, at 352. Scholars have also addressed 
this question comparatively. For instance, an analysis of the High Court of Australia 
finds that the justices are less likely to vote for the side represented by a female 
attorney when that side is the appellant but not when that side is the respondent. See
Russell Smyth & Vinod Mishra, Barrister Gender and Litigant Success in the High 
Court of Australia, 49 AUSTL. J. POL. SCI. 1, 3 (2014). Mishra and Smyth also find 
that this negative effect can be remedied with additional female justices and 
additional liberal justices on the bench, though this has yet to fully offset the effects 
(as Smith and his colleagues find). Id. at 7-8. This suggests that women and liberal 
justices may behave more favorably toward female attorneys although this has yet to 
be empirically tested.
29. Peter Kollock, Philip Blumstein & Pepper Schwartz, Sex and Power in 
Interaction: Conversational Privileges and Duties, 50 AM. SOC. REV. 34, 35 (1985).
See generally Barbara G. Kanki, Valerie Greaud Folk & Cheryl M. Irwin, 
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Communication also enables people to state their intentions and to 
send and receive information between others in the group.30
Put in political science terms, actors speak in an effort to move 
conversations toward their preferred outcome or to at least ensure a 
decision will not be moved toward a least desirable outcome. For 
instance, Supreme Court Justices sitting at oral arguments may 
attempt to control the direction of a discussion by asking questions or 
by making statements toward the arguing attorney about how they 
view the case. In so doing, the Justices are able to help or hinder an 
attorney arguing a case before the High Court.
While we are interested in how speaking can move a discussion 
in a specific direction, we are more interested in how, if a person 
wants to move a discussion toward issues he or she prefers to 
discuss, interrupting another participant is often an effective strategy. 
Indeed, Smith-Lovin and Brody31 explain that interruptions are 
meant to prevent a particular speaker from completing a thought or 
from accomplishing interactional goals (which, for our purposes, 
means an attorney trying to convince the Court to rule in a particular 
way). Additionally, interruptions may serve to disorganize a person’s 
speech, and ultimately, her ideas.32
The key to this literature is that, by interrupting a speaker, 
another member of a group can change the entire dynamic of a 
decision-making process.33 In other words, while communication is 
generally meant to convey specific information in a group decision-
making process, interruptions are meant to alter the topic or overall 
dynamic of the conversation.
Beyond general interruptions, we suggest this strategy can 
sometimes be interpreted as a negative signal based on the language 
used by an interrupter.34 In fact, scholars argue that those who 
interrupt others have more power and dominance than the speaker 
Communication Variance and Aircrew Performance, 1 INT’L J. AVIATION PSYCHOL.
149, 150 (1991).
30. Rick van der Kleij et al., Effects of Time Pressure and Communication 
Environment on Team Processes and Outcomes in Dyadic Planning, 67 INT’L J.
HUMAN-COMPUTER STUD. 411, 412 (2009).
31. See generally Lynn Smith-Lovin & Charles Brody, Interruptions in 
Group Discussion: The Effects of Gender and Group Composition, 54 AM. SOC.
REV. 424 (1989).
32. See generally Candace West, Against Our Will: Male Interruptions of 
Females in Cross-Sex Conversation, 327 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 81 (1979).
33. Id.
34. KARPOWITZ & MENDELBERG, supra note 10, at 202.
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who has been interrupted.35 The consequences of such behavior are 
great. Indeed, when members of lower-status groups are interrupted, 
the negative communication tends to silence them.36 This negative 
communication also has a negative effect on overall brain function. 
According to Newberg and Waldman, the stress hormones released 
when a person experiences something negative immediately 
“interrupt the normal functioning of your brain, impairing logic, 
reason, language processing, and communication.”37 Research by 
Spalek et al. shows that women react to negative emotions more 
strongly than men.38 These stronger emotions produce increased 
amounts of stress hormones, which in turn, further impair brain 
function.39
This intuition stems from research that ties emotion expressed 
through language to people’s feelings, intentions, and psychological 
thinking.40 The claim that words carry emotional content is neither 
new nor controversial among decision-making scholars.41 Further, 
individuals use emotions with the greatest frequency when they are 
concerned about an outcome from a decision-making process.42 In 
short, the language one uses when interrupting another speaker may 
35. Lyn Kathlene, Power and Influence in State Legislative Policymaking: 
The Interaction of Gender and Position in Committee Hearing Debates, 88 AM. POL.
SOC. REV. 560, 564 (1994).
36. KARPOWITZ & MENDELBERG, supra note 10, at 202.
37. Andrew Newberg & Mark Waldman, The Most Dangerous Word in the 
World, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Aug. 1, 2012), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/
words-can-change-your-brain/201208/the-most-dangerous-word-in-the-world 
[https://perma.cc/2DLA-HKX3].
38. See generally Klara Spalek et al., Sex-Dependent Dissociation Between 
Emotional Appraisal and Memory: A Large-Scale Behavioral and fMRI Study, 35 J.
NEUROSCIENCE 920 (2015).
39. Id.; see also Newberg & Waldman, supra note 37.
40. See Yla R. Tausczik & James W. Pennebaker, The Psychological 
Meaning of Words: LIWC and Computerized Text Analysis Methods, 29 J.
LANGUAGE & SOC. PSYCHOL. 24, 37 (2010).
41. See generally, e.g., NICO H. FRIJDA, THE EMOTIONS (1986); Richard P. 
Bagozzi et al., Cultural and Situational Contingencies and the Theory of Reasoned 
Action: Application to Fast Food Restaurant Consumption, 9 J. CONSUMER 
PSYCHOL. 97 (2000); see also James W. Pennebaker, Matthias R. Mehl & Kate G. 
Niederhoffer, Psychological Aspects of Natural Language Use: Our Words, Our 
Selves, 54 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 547, 571-72 (2003); Rik G. M. Pieters & W. Fred 
Van Raaij, Functions and Management of Affect: Applications to Economic 
Behavior, 9 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 251, 259 (1988).
42. See Marcel Zeelenberg et al., On Emotion Specificity in Decision 
Making: Why Feeling Is for Doing, 3 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 18, 20 (2008).
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affect the degree to which a speaker is able to make a point or 
convince others to make a decision.
In turn, if there is an emotional element to language a political 
actor uses, and if the political actor has a preference over an 
outcome, then the actor’s emotions indicate what decision she will 
make. Zeelenberg and his colleagues explain this relationship: “We 
propose that emotions commit decision makers to certain courses of 
action by providing control precedence (Frijda, 1986) which means 
that the experience of an emotion brings forward an associated goal 
that may overrule other goals . . . .”43 Linguists,44 sociolinguists,45
discourse analysts,46 and communications scholars47 reach similar 
conclusions. They demonstrate that words, and the emotions behind 
them, provide valuable insight into people’s intentions, motives, and 
desires. In turn, Zeelenberg et al. conclude, “emotions can be 
understood as programs for intuitive decision-making, imposing 
upon the decision maker inclinations for action that, in a given 
situation, most adequately serve current strivings.”48 Ultimately, 
understanding emotions is important;49 by systematically analyzing 
people’s words—and thus their desires and intentions—it is possible 
to predict their actions.50
The question is whether women face more negative treatment 
than do men, especially when men interrupt women during 
conversation. Karpowitz and Mendelberg find they do. In their 
analysis of negative interruptions—what they define as an 
interruption that “claims the floor from the speaker to express 
disapproval or opposition”51—they demonstrate that such 
43. Id. at 19.
44. See, e.g., Cynthia M. Whissell & Michael R.J. Dewson, A Dictionary of 
Affect in Language: III. Analysis of Two Biblical and Two Secular Passages, 62 
PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 127, 131 (1986).
45. See, e.g., Penelope Eckert & Sally McConnell-Ginet, New 
Generalizations and Explanations in Language and Gender Research, 28 
LANGUAGE SOC’Y 185, 199-200 (1999).
46. See, e.g., Deborah Schiffrin, The Textual and Contextual Basis of 
Discourse, 102 SEMIOTICA 101, 101-02 (1994).
47. See, e.g., Laura K. Guerrero, Jess K. Alberts & Brian Heisterkamp, 
Discrepancy Arousal Theory and Cognitive Valence Theory, in THE NEW 
HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 57, 68-69 (W. Peter Robinson 
& Howard Giles eds., 2001).
48. Zeelenberg et al., supra note 42, at 24.
49. See generally Pennebaker, Mehl & Niederhoffer, supra note 41.
50. Zeelenberg et al., supra note 42, at 19.
51. Tali Mendelberg & Christopher F. Karpowitz, Power, Gender, and 
Group Discussion, 37 ADVANCES POL. PSYCHOL. 1, 14 (2016).
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interruptions undermine a speaker’s authority as they engage in the 
conversation.52 Such negative interruptions, in turn, affect females in 
a more adverse way than they affect males. Karpowitz and 
Mendelberg find that men make more negative interruptions than 
women do and that women are three times more likely than men to 
stop speaking and yield to the person interrupting them.53 When such 
negative interruptions are received, women are more likely than men 
to be negatively affected because they typically come into a 
discussion with a lower level of assumed authority.54 The bottom line 
is that women are more often interrupted than are men during 
discussions, and when done so negatively, such behavior has clear 
effects on their ability to make a strong argument.
III. SUPREME COURT ORAL ARGUMENTS
Based on the multidisciplinary findings in the previous Part, we 
posit there are two components of language (interruptions and 
negative emotion) that may help us understand a speaker’s view of a 
particular topic. Recognizing this, we turn to U.S. Supreme Court 
oral arguments to gain insight into how the language Justices invoke 
during these proceedings may allow us to predict individual votes 
and aggregate case outcomes. We first place our study within 
existing works. 
Oral arguments are an important component in the Supreme 
Court’s decision-making process. In particular, they provide Justices 
with information and offer a “fresh perspective[]” when deciding 
cases.55 On this account, these proceedings influence case outcomes 
because they give Justices an opportunity to clear up lingering 
questions from the briefs and to gauge their colleagues’ views.56
Research also demonstrates the quality of arguments influences 
Justices’ decisions.57 A growing body of evidence also suggests oral 
52. Id.
53. KARPOWITZ & MENDELBERG, supra note 10, at 203.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN 
AMERICAN POLITICS 246 (8th ed. 2008); see also JEFFREY A. SEGEL & HAROLD J.
SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 280 (2002).
56. See, e.g., TIMOTHY R. JOHNSON, ORAL ARGUMENTS AND DECISION 
MAKING ON THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 21 (2004); Stephen L. Wasby, 
Anthony A. D’Amato & Rosemary Metrailer, The Functions of Oral Argument in 
the U.S. Supreme Court, 62 Q.J. SPEECH 410, 418-19 (1976).
57. See, e.g., Timothy R. Johnson, Paul J. Wahlbeck & James F. Spriggs, II, 
The Influence of Oral Arguments on the U.S. Supreme Court, 100 AM. POL. SCI.
Gender Dynamics and Supreme Court Arguments 1043
arguments may provide a barometer of how Justices will rule in a 
given case. For example, Chief Justice John Roberts has suggested 
that the number of questions asked during oral arguments can be 
used to predict case outcomes.58 Before joining the Court, Roberts 
tested this hypothesis by tallying the number of questions asked of 
advocates in a small number of arguments. Across a sample of 
twenty-eight cases selected from two terms, he found that 86% of the 
time the party receiving the most inquiries from the bench ultimately 
lost the case.59
Court watchers extend the Chief Justice’s findings. Greenhouse 
proposes it may be possible to predict the outcome of cases because 
the “tenor of the argument” often reveals Justices’ intentions.60 For 
instance, when the Court heard oral arguments in Crawford v. 
Marion County Election Board,61 she speculated the Justices’ 
“questioning indicated that a majority did not accept the challenger’s 
basic argument—that voter-impersonation fraud is not a problem.”62
For Greenhouse, the Justices’ behavior also meant they wanted to 
dismiss the case. Additionally, she pointed out that Justice Scalia 
spoke “with evident disapproval” during his questioning.63
Ultimately, Greenhouse suggests the tone of oral argument questions 
can be used to predict outcomes—or at least some Justices’ votes. 
Evidence across cases, Justices, and time supports these 
anecdotes. In her response to the Supreme Court Forecasting 
Project,64 Greenhouse reexamined her oral argument stories from the 
2002 term and reviewed her predictions in sixteen cases.65 What she 
found was not a surprise to her but may have been to the other 
participants in the project. Indeed, Greenhouse predicted the 
REV. 99, 99 (2006); see generally, e.g., Andrea McAtee & Kevin T. McGuire, 
Lawyers, Justices, and Issue Salience: When and How Do Legal Arguments Affect 
the U.S. Supreme Court?, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 259 (2007).
58. John G. Roberts, Jr., Oral Advocacy and the Re-emergence of a 
Supreme Court Bar, 30 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 68, 75 (2005).
59. Id.
60. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Indicate They May Uphold Voter ID Rules,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/10/washington/
10scotus.html [https://perma.cc/8RSV-7VPP].
61. 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
62. Greenhouse, supra note 60.
63. Id. 
64. See generally Theodore W. Ruger et al., The Supreme Court 
Forecasting Project: Legal and Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme 
Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150 (2004).
65. Linda Greenhouse, Press Room Predictions, 2 PERSP. ON POLS. 781, 
781-84 (2004).
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outcomes of more cases and votes of individual Justices, based on 
her assessment of questions asked during arguments, than either side 
of the forecasting project. She attributes her advantage over the 
computer based or expertise approach to the fact that hers were 
“postargument predictions.”66
Two additional studies extend these analyses and further hint at 
a role for the emotional content of Justices’ questions. Analyzing a 
sample of ten cases from the Court’s 2002 term, Shullman finds 
initial evidence to suggest that Justices’ language may be related to 
Court decisions.67 Having coded whether the Justices’ questions were 
either helpful or hostile in nature, Shullman notes that “[m]any of the 
Justices pose hostile or argumentative questions to both sides, but it 
seems that more often they go easy on the lawyer for the party they 
support and only play devil’s advocate to the lawyer for the party 
they oppose.”68 Wrightsman uses a different coding scheme and a 
sample of twenty-four cases to reach a similar conclusion.69
We draw two lessons from the literature in these two Parts.
First, females will speak less than their male colleagues during 
discussion and in appellate arguments in particular. Second, evidence 
demonstrates the emotional content of Justices’ language at oral 
arguments may help scholars predict how they will vote. Thus, 
female attorneys are likely to be treated differently than their male 
counterparts in terms of the negative language they face from the 
bench. Here we seek to test these two conjectures.
IV. DATA
To test these hypotheses, we analyze transcripts of all cases 
argued orally before the Supreme Court from 1986 to 2010. Because 
cases involve petitioners and respondents, we include an observation 
for each Justice for each attorney that presents arguments before the 
Court. To better illustrate, consider oral arguments for Gonzales v. 
Carhart, a case that concerned a federal law banning partial-birth 
66. See id. at 782.
67. See generally Sarah Levien Shullman, The Illusion of Devil’s Advocacy: 
How the Justices of the Supreme Court Foreshadow Their Decisions During Oral 
Argument, 6 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 271 (2004) (arguing that the frequency and 
content of Justices’ questions to counsel during oral arguments could be predictors 
of how Justices will vote).
68. See id. at 292.
69. LAWRENCE WRIGHTSMAN, ORAL ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE SUPREME 
COURT: AN EMPIRICAL APPROACH 138-41 (2008).
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abortions.70 The proceedings began with the U.S. Solicitor General, 
Paul D. Clement, presenting arguments for the United States. This 
produced seven observations because we include an observation for
each Justice that interacted with the Solicitor General during these 
important proceedings. After he concluded, Priscilla J. Smith 
presented arguments for the respondent, Dr. LeRoy Carhart et al.
Likewise, her argument also produced seven observations. In total, 
Gonzales v. Carhart yields fourteen observations. We repeated this 
coding scheme for all cases in our sample. Ultimately, this yields a 
total of more than 31,000 observations. 
A. Dependent Variables
To examine how Justices interact with attorneys, we employ 
two sets of dependent variables. First, we estimate the amount of 
time attorneys are allowed to speak during oral arguments. To do 
this, we compare the speaking times of Justices with the speaking 
times of attorneys. That is, we compare the amount of time Justices 
and attorneys speak. More specifically, we divide the amount of time 
each individual Justice talks by the amount of time each individual 
attorney talks. Larger values indicate Justices are speaking more 
during arguments. This measure serves as a useful proxy for the 
degree to which Justices allow attorneys to have their say. It also 
comports with recent analyses, including Patton and Smith’s.71
Second, we examine the positive and negative content Justices 
employ when addressing attorneys. More specifically, we examine 
the percentage of language Justices direct toward an attorney that is 
positive (pleasant) or negative (unpleasant). This is not the first study 
to analyze the emotive content displayed at oral arguments. In fact, 
examinations of emotive content are becoming prominent features of 
research investigating oral arguments.72 The reason for this is 
intuitive. These measures provide unique opportunities to better 
understand these highly public and important proceedings. For us, 
the emotive content displayed at oral arguments provides a 
quantifiable measure for analyzing how Justices address attorneys.
70. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 133 (2007).
71. Patton & Smith, supra note 26, at 341-42.
72. See, e.g., WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 69, at 131-32; Greenhouse, supra
note 60; Shullman, supra note 67, at 273; see generally, e.g., Ryan C. Black et al., 
Emotions, Oral Arguments, and Supreme Court Decision Making, 73 J. POL. 572 
(2011).
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B. Independent Variables
Our primary expectation is that Justices will treat female 
attorneys differently than male attorneys. To account for this, we 
include a dichotomous variable, Female Litigant. We code this 
variable by investigating how Supreme Court Justices address 
litigants participating in oral arguments. Specifically, we employ the 
honorifics—“Mr.”, “Mrs.”, and “Ms.”—Justices use when 
addressing litigants to determine gender. Female attorneys are coded 
1, and male attorneys are coded 0.73
In addition to Female Litigant, we include a number of control 
variables. First, we include a variable to control for whether cases 
involving gendered issues affect judicial behavior during these 
important proceedings. To determine whether a case involves a 
gendered issue, we follow the coding guidelines of the Supreme 
Court Database.74 Specifically, we demarcate all cases that concern 
gender discrimination, abortion, or contraception as gendered 
issues.75 These issues have been employed in existing research that 
analyzes the relationship between gender and judicial decision 
making76 and dovetail with existing research on the difference 
women make on legislative policy making.77 Cases involving gender 
discrimination, abortion, or contraception are set equal to 1 and 0 
otherwise. 
In addition to gendered issues, we account for the salience of a 
case. To capture the salience of a case, judicial scholars have relied 
on the salience measure created by Epstein and Segal.78 However, we 
73. We took a random sample of attorney names from the transcripts to spot 
check the accuracy of this approach. Our results were highly accurate.
74. Harold J. Spaeth et al., Supreme Court Database, WASH. U. L. (2017),
http://supremecourtdatabase.org [https://perma.cc/T4VN-M3K3].
75. In the Supreme Court Database, we use the Issue variable to identify 
gendered issues, and we code the following Issues 20130 (gender discrimination), 
20140 (abortion), and 50020 (contraception) as gendered issues. 
76. Phillips & Carter, supra note 21, at 643; Szmer et al., supra note 17, at 
72; Patton & Smith, supra note 26, at 337.
77. See, e.g., Michele L. Swers, THE DIFFERENCE WOMEN MAKE: THE 
POLICY IMPACT OF WOMEN IN CONGRESS 2, 5 (2002); see generally, e.g., Michele L. 
Swers, Pursuing Women’s Interests in Partisan Times: Explaining Gender 
Differences in Legislative Activity on Health, Education, and Women’s Health 
Issues, 37 J. WOMEN, POL. & POL’Y 249 (2016).
78. Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring Issue Salience, 44 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 66, 72-81 (2000).
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employ the Case Salience Index created by Collins and Cooper.79
This index was created to handle the limitations that accompany 
measures that use front-page stories of The New York Times to 
estimate the salience of cases before the Supreme Court. Instead of 
relying exclusively on whether a case was covered on the front page 
of The New York Times, the Case Salience Index develops estimates 
based on news coverage of four newspapers from four regions of the 
United States.80 It estimates the salience of cases as follows: cases 
that are reported on the front page of a paper are given a value of 2, 
cases that are covered anywhere in the paper are given a value of 1, 
and cases that are not reported on are given a value of 0.81 These 
scores are summed together and range from 0 to 8.
Since judicial scholars consistently find ideology influences all 
aspects of judicial behavior, we account for ideological predilections. 
This requires ideological estimates for Justices and attorneys. For 
Justices, we use Martin and Quinn82 scores to represent their 
ideological preferences. For attorneys, unfortunately, estimates are 
nonexistent. We overcome this limitation by using the median of the 
Supreme Court as a proxy for the side preferred by a majority of 
Justices and the losing side is set equal to -1 multiplied by the 
Court’s median Martin Quinn Score for that case. Once we obtain 
ideological estimates for attorneys, we simply take the absolute 
difference between a Justice’s ideological estimate and an attorney’s 
estimate. Higher values represent greater distances between Justices 
and attorneys. 
We also include two variables to represent participation by the 
Office of the Solicitor General. First, we include a dichotomous 
variable to indicate whether the Office of the Solicitor General 
participated in oral arguments. If a litigant is either the Solicitor 
General or Assistant Solicitor General, then this variable is equal to 1 
and 0 otherwise. Second, we include a dichotomous variable to 
indicate whether the Actual Solicitor General participated in oral 
arguments. When this occurs the Actual Solicitor General is equal to 
1 and 0 otherwise. 
79. See generally Todd A. Collins & Christopher A. Cooper, The Case 
Salience Index, Public Opinion, and Decision Making on the U.S. Supreme Court,
37 JUST. SYS. J. 232 (2016).
80. Id. at 235. 
81. Id. at 236. 
82. See generally Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal 
Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-
1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134 (2002).
1048 Michigan State Law Review 2017
Importantly, we include two other dichotomous variables. First, 
we include Petitioner, which denotes whether the attorney represents 
the petitioner or the respondent. When an attorney represents the 
petitioner, this variable is set equal to 1 and 0 otherwise. Second, we 
include a dichotomous variable to indicate whether the Justice is 
female, Female Justice. This variable is set equal to 1 when the 
Justice is Sandra Day O’Connor, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia 
Sotomayor, or Elena Kagan, and 0 otherwise. Finally, we control for 
how Justices interact with opposing counsel. In Model 1 this is 
simply the positive emotive measures for opposing counsel, and in 
Model 2 this is the negative emotive content for opposing counsel. 
V. RESULTS
Because our first dependent variable is operationalized on a 
continuous scale, we employ ordinary least squares to study how an 
attorney’s gender affects oral arguments. Initially we demonstrate the 
willingness of Justices to allow attorneys the ability to speak during 
these important proceedings and then turn to the factors that affect 
the emotive content Justices direct toward litigants arguing before 
the Court. 
We begin with the analysis of whether Justices treat male and 
female attorneys differently in terms of speaking time. Table 1 
displays our results and indicates a positive and significant 
relationship between female litigants and the degree to which 
Justices allow them to speak less often. Specifically, the positive and 
significant effect demonstrates Justices have a greater propensity to 
talk over female attorneys than to speak over male attorneys. This is 
clearly in line with our theoretical expectation and comports with the 
existing literature.
Table 1: Ordinary Least Squares: The Effects of Gender on 
the Ability of Attorneys to Speak During Supreme Court Oral 
Arguments
Amount of Speaking Time
Female Litigant 0.037***
0.006
Gender Issues 0.119***
0.016
Case Salience Index 0.0003
0.001
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Actual Solicitor General 0.024***
0.008
Any Solicitor General 0.029***
0.005
Ideological Distance 0.004*
0.002
Justice Vote for Attorney -0.004
0.005
Female Justice 0.007
0.005
Petitioner 0.024***
0.004
Observations 31,887
R-squared 0.005
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Beyond our variable of interest there are other factors that 
affect speaking times during oral argument. Justices not only are 
more likely to speak more than female attorneys, but are more likely 
to act in this way even in cases that involve gendered issues.
Specifically, cases involving gender discrimination, abortion, and 
contraception appear to generate more discussion from Justices. In 
addition, Justices are also more likely to speak over petitioners and 
ideologically distant attorneys. Indeed, the positive and significant 
effect for Petitioner may reflect the fact that the institutional 
structure of these proceedings shapes interactions between Justices 
and litigants. The coefficient for Ideological Distance is also positive 
and significant, which should come as no surprise. In fact, previous 
research consistently finds Justices are more willing to allow 
ideologically distant attorneys to speak less often.83 Finally, Justices 
are more willing to speak over attorneys representing the Office of 
the Solicitor General. The coefficients for Actual Solicitor General 
and Any Solicitor General are both positive and significant. While 
these findings may suggest Justices are less deferential to Solicitor 
Generals and their staff, we believe that when taken into 
consideration with the results in the next model (see Table 2) these 
findings indicate Justices are potentially seeking information from a 
trusted and important litigant. 
83. See Black et al., supra note 72, at 524.
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Table 2: Ordinary Least Squares: The Effects of Gender on 
the Emotional Content of Justice Utterances During Supreme 
Court Oral Arguments
Model 1
Positive Emotions
Model 2
Negative Emotions
Female Litigant -0.071*
0.038
0.046*
0.025
Gender Issues -0.010
0.092
0.215***
0.059
Case Salience Index -0.002
0.006
0.007*
0.004
Actual Solicitor 
General
-0.005
0.049
0.029
0.032
Any Solicitor 
General
-0.086***
0.027
0.003
0.017
Ideological Distance -0.018
0.012
-0.013*
0.007
Justice Vote for 
Attorney
0.153***
0.033
0.012
0.021
Female Justice -0.311***
0.031
-0.125***
0.020
Petitioner -0.055**
0.025
0.143***
0.016
Emotion to 
Opposition
0.110***
0.005
0.123***
0.005
Observations 31,965 31,965
R-squared 0.019 0.020
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
In addition to the results in Table 1, Table 2 provides support 
for the expectation that Justices treat female attorneys differently 
from how they treat male attorneys. Focusing on the first column 
(Model 1), the negative and significant coefficient for Female 
Litigant provides evidence that Justices employ less positive 
(pleasant) language when addressing female attorneys. Focusing on 
the second column in Table 2, the positive and significant coefficient 
for Female Litigant also demonstrates that, when female litigants 
present oral arguments before the Court, Justices use more 
unpleasant words toward them. That is, the percentage of unpleasant 
words directed at a litigant increases when the attorney is female. 
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While the effect of this finding may seem, at first blush, 
substantively insignificant, it is anything but trivial. On average, the 
percentage of a Justice’s language directed toward litigants that is 
negative or unpleasant is approximately 1.5%. However, when 
Justices interact with female litigants, Justices’ negativity or 
unpleasantness increases to approximately 2%. To put this in 
perspective, this is an increase of approximately 33%, which 
suggests the change in negativity is noteworthy. 
As in Table 1, a number of control variables are significant in 
either Model 1 or Model 2. In Model 1, both Any SG and Voted for 
Attorney are significant. Somewhat surprisingly, the coefficient for 
Any SG is negative, which suggests attorneys from the Office of the 
Solicitor General receive less positive language when questioned by 
Justices. However, when taken in context with Model 1, where the 
effect for Any SG is insignificant, this finding suggests attorneys 
representing the Office of the Solicitor General receive less positive, 
and potentially more neutral, language in their interactions with 
Justices. Also in Model 1, the coefficient for Voted for Attorney is 
positive and significant, which suggests Justices are more pleasant 
toward litigants they end up supporting. This finding is also in line 
with previous research.84
In Model 2, both Gender Issue and Case Salience Index are 
positive and significant.85 Model 2 shows that Justices use more 
negative language when participating in oral arguments in cases 
involving gender discrimination, abortion, or contraception. The 
emotive content of Justices’ discussions increasingly becomes more 
negative. Table 2 also shows Justices use more negative language as 
a case becomes more salient. This may reflect the skepticism of 
Justices in cases where their preferences are probably more set as 
well as their willingness to challenge attorneys in such cases. Beyond 
these variables, the coefficient for Ideological Distance is negative 
and significant in Model 2. This is intuitive—Justices who are 
ideologically closer to a litigant simply do not treat him or her as 
poorly as they treat those with whom they may disagree.
Finally, three variables are significant in both models. First, 
Female Justice is not only significant, but also negative in both 
models. Combined, this suggests female Justices differ from male 
Justices in how they participate in these proceedings. Specifically, 
84. See, e.g., WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 69, at 140-41; Black et al., supra
note 72, at 579; Greenhouse, supra note 60; Shullman, supra note 67, at 278.
85. See supra Table 2. 
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our results show female Justices are not only less positive (Model 1),
but also less negative (Model 2) toward attorneys. Second, Petitioner
is negative in Model 1 and positive in Model 2, which indicates the 
institutional structure of oral arguments potentially influences how 
Justices speak to petitioners and respondents. Third, Emotion to 
Opposition is positive and significant in both models, which 
indicates Justices treat aspirants before the Court somewhat 
similarly. Overall, these findings provide more context for Justices’ 
participation throughout oral arguments. 
Certainly, the results of the above analysis are compelling. 
However, to bolster them we perform a Robustness Check. We do so 
because although our dependent variables are measured on a
continuous scale, they contain upper and lower bounds. For example, 
none of our dependent variables can be below 0, and our emotive 
content variables cannot exceed 100. Because of these constraints we 
also employ Tobit regression models.86 Moreover, because our data 
are not independent and are identically distributed, we also use 
robust standard errors clustered on each individual Justice. 
Table 3 and Table 4 present results for our robustness check, 
and we focus exclusively on our primary expectations, which mirror 
our prior results.87 Table 3 displays a positive and significant effect 
for female litigants, which is similar to our previous results. This 
finding indicates Justices are more likely to interrupt and talk over 
females during oral arguments. Additionally, in Table 4, the 
coefficient for Female Litigant in Model 1 is insignificant, but in 
Model 2 it is positive and significant. This latter finding suggests 
Justices are likely to employ negative emotive content when 
addressing attorneys.88 Moreover, the effect of Female Litigant on 
the negative content of Justices’ utterances in Table 4 is substantially 
greater than it is in Table 2. 
86. RICHARD BREEN, 111 REGRESSION MODELS: CENSORED, SAMPLE-
SELECTED, OR TRUNCATED DATA 12 (1996).
87. See infra Tables 3 & 4. 
88. Black et al., supra note 72, at 572.
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Table 3: Tobit Regression: The Effects of Gender on the 
Ability of Attorneys to Speak During Supreme Court Oral 
Arguments
Interruptions
Female Litigant 0.040***
0.008
Gender Issues 0.126***
0.040
Case Salience Index 0.0002
0.009
Actual Solicitor General 0.030***
0.009
Any Solicitor General 0.032***
0.006
Ideological Distance 0.004*
0.013
Justice Vote for Attorney -0.0008
0.009
Female Justice 0.016
0.037
Petitioner 0.035***
0.015
Observations 31,887
McKelvey and Zavoina 
R-squared
0.005
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 4: Tobit Regression: Robustness Check for the 
Effects of Gender on the Emotional Content of Justice 
Utterances During Supreme Court Oral Arguments
Model 1
Positive Emotions
Model 2
Negative Emotions
Female Litigant -0.063
0.053
0.083***
0.020
Gender Issues -0.019
0.118
0.244***
0.080
Case Salience Index -0.001
0.009
0.012
0.007
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Actual Solicitor 
General
0.017
0.064
0.067*
0.040
Any Solicitor 
General
-0.064
0.060
0.023
0.035
Ideological Distance -0.019
0.086
-0.012
0.060
Justice Vote for 
Attorney
0.195**
0.078
0.019
0.032
Female Justice -0.323
0.315
-0.176
0.179
Petitioner -0.004
0.115
0.245
0.184
Emotion to 
Opposition
0.121**
0.050
0.151*
0.031
Observations 31,968 31,968
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
VI. DISCUSSION
A growing body of literature reveals that the treatment of 
women in political deliberations is not always pretty.89 In this 
Article, we have taken the natural step toward better understanding 
how Justices interact with male and female attorneys by examining 
this interaction at the individual level. We theorized that gender 
would affect how Justices address attorneys during oral arguments.
Specifically, we expected Justices to treat male and female 
attorneys differently during oral arguments. The findings presented 
above support our expectations. Justices allow female attorneys to 
speak less. This, however, is not all. Female attorneys also receive 
less positive emotional content and more negative emotional 
questions and comments from Justices. Combined, these findings 
reaffirm prior literature that shows the treatment of women in 
political deliberations is not always pretty.90 Substantively, our 
findings clearly indicate that an attorney’s gender affects how he or 
she will be treated by Justices during oral arguments. But what else 
do our findings suggest? When placed alongside existing research 
more generally, our findings do not present a rosier picture for 
89. See generally, e.g., KARPOWITZ & MENDELBERG, supra note 10; see, 
e.g., Patton & Smith, supra note 26, at 338; Phillips & Carter, supra note 21, at 643; 
Szmer et al., supra note 17, at 73.
90. See generally KARPOWITZ & MENDELBERG, supra note 10.
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female litigants. After all, it is well documented that attorneys who 
are treated more unpleasantly and are not allowed to speak as much 
are less likely to win at the Court.91 Given female attorneys face both 
types of negative treatment, it is not a stretch to think female 
attorneys have an uphill battle in front of the Supreme Court. And 
this has implications not only for female attorneys, but also for their 
clients. 
Future research has several options for presenting a fuller 
picture for whether Justices do in fact treat female attorneys 
differently. For example, scholarship could explicitly model whether 
female litigants are less likely to win at the Court. In particular, this 
research could take a step back and examine how aggregate patterns 
of Justice and attorney interactions influence the likelihood that the 
Court rules for or against female litigants. In addition, future 
research could examine under what conditions individual Justices are 
more likely to vote in favor of female litigants. Finally, future 
research could go beyond the Supreme Court and examine state or 
foreign courts to better understand how judges treat and address 
female attorneys. These avenues of exploration are ripe for future 
scholarship and could better document the potential uphill battle 
female attorneys face within and beyond appellate courts.
91. See, e.g., WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 69, at 140-41; Black et al., supra
note 72, at 572; Greenhouse, supra note 65, at 782; Shullman, supra note 67, at 272.
